Themes from my new book

My book 'When Bubbles Burst: Surviving the Financial Fallout" has just been published (Nicholas Brealey, 2009). I have set up this blog to follow up on the book's themes as the financial crisis and recession unfold. What follows here are the Key Messages from the book:

-First of all BUBBLES MATTER. They have become the driver of booms and busts in economies around the world over the last 20 years and, this time, have nearly destroyed the banking system while causing probably the worst recession since the Second World War. That bubbles matter is widely accepted now (though it wasn't when I published the first edition of this book in 2004).

CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
-The prime cause of the financial crisis and economic downturn was the US housing bubble and the way it was financed.

-The US housing bubble was part of a worldwide housing boom and was the leading edge of a wider credit bubble which led to excess leverage and under-pricing of risk. But the primary mistake, and still the source of most of banks’ losses, was the belief that house prices would not fall back.

-The UK is suffering badly because of its own housing bubble and the weakness of the financial industry, London’s leading sector.

-The extent of other countries’ downturn is dependent on two factors: the size of their own housing bubble (especially bad in Spain, Ireland, Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, parts of Eastern Europe but also a problem in many other countries including China and Canada); and the extent of their dependence on exports, (a major problem for Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan in Asia as well as commodity producers worldwide).

-The origins of the housing bubble go back to low interest rates, BOTH short-term and long-term, which can in turn be traced back to earlier bubbles. Low short-term rates in the US (and the UK and elsewhere) in 2001-4 were put in place to deal with the aftermath of the stocks bubble. Low long-term rates were the consequence of capital inflows from Japan and East Asia due to their excess savings. This excess savings (with the exception of China) follows the collapse of their bubbles in the 1990s.

-Lax regulation was a major cause of the crisis, though much of the problem was poor implementation rather than inadequate rules. Allowing banks to have off-balance sheet assets which were not truly off-balance sheet was one major mistake. Another was the US Federal Reserve’s failure to regulate the sub-prime mortgage market.


OUTLOOK FOR HOUSE PRICES
-House prices in both the US and UK are likely to fall at least 40% peak-to-trough. This will take them back to sensible valuations in relation to incomes and rents but there is a risk of an overshoot on the downside.

-House prices in Canada (where I live now) should fall a bit less, maybe 30% on average, with the biggest falls in the West (Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton).

-The adjustment in the US is already well-advanced. Latest data (Case-Shiller index) show about a 29% drop so far, but prices have been falling rapidly through the winter so the total decline will already be nearer 35%, because the data lags by several months. The UK adjustment started a year later and has much further to go. Canada started even later.

-House prices are falling world-wide currently and will continue.

-A key driver of falling home prices is tighter credit requirements, particularly the need for higher down-payments. Others are foreclosures (especially in the US), rising unemployment and negative price expectations.

-More than one-third of Americans and one quarter of Britons will end up with a mortgage loan greater than the value of their home.


ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
-We are in a worldwide recession, which could be the worst since the Second World War for the US and Europe. Tighter credit and lower asset values have triggered a widespread cutback in consumer and business spending. A sharp inventory recession in the US and Europe is being transmitted around the world through the global supply chain.

-Highly active government and central bank policy as well as the natural cycle should mean that 2010 is a year of recovery, with the first signs probable before end-2009.

-But in the US and UK the recovery is likely to be weak with unemployment rising into 2010. The upswing will be held back by consumers’ desire to increase their savings rate from the low levels during the housing bubble. Asia should recover more vigorously.

-Deflation is likely in the US but may be avoided in Britain through the lower pound. Wage growth will slump in 2009-10 as salaries are frozen or cut, while company pricing power will be very limited and commodity prices will stay weak. The US will likely experience deflation (on core indices) in 2010.


GOVERNMENT POLICY
-Measures to prevent the full adjustment in house prices are doomed to failure and could delay economic recovery. There will be a case, however, for trying to avoid a major price overshoot through policies such as mortgage modification.

-Hyperactive monetary and fiscal policy will be slow to gain traction because the monetary transmission mechanism has been broken by the credit crunch while tax cuts will mostly be saved and new infrastructure spending will take time.

-Restoring the financial system to health requires both removing the bad debts and recapitalizing the banks. One, without the other, will not work. This is slowly being recognized but again will take time to implement and will have a substantial fiscal cost.

-The biggest legacy of the crisis will be large fiscal deficits and much higher government debt ratios. Starting probably in 2011 governments will face the huge task of reducing deficits. A period of rapid economic growth would help but, despite the deep recession, this is unlikely as consumers will continue to prefer saving to spending.

-There is little risk of new bubbles in the near future, at least in US and European stock or property markets. But a new regulatory structure, focused more on credit growth, the extent of leverage and identifying bubbles early, is required.

-We need explicit tools to recognize and limit bubbles – for example anti-cyclical capital or reserve requirements. Also, bubbles almost always bring innovations in financing and new lending institutions, so it will be vital to have regulatory agencies able to respond quickly and decisively to changing circumstances.


FOR INVESTORS
-Bear markets in housing typically last 3-5 years so there is no rush to buy. Moreover investors need to remember that just because a property can be bought for half its value a few years ago does not make it cheap.

-Investors should focus on rental yields and not expect a quick recovery in capital values. The book explains how to judge rental returns.

-Although stock markets have fallen 40-50% or more around the world they are not wildly cheap. Some Asian markets were in a bubble in 2007 and even the major markets were pricey then, with profits at unusually high levels. Profits will be very weak in 2008 and only recover slowly after that.

-A new leg down in stocks is very possible. It would damage confidence and hurt the economic outlook but would then open up very good investment opportunities. Investors need to focus on value and take a contrarian approach.

-The decline in asset values since 2007 has upset many people’s savings and retirement plans. It has also opened up a huge gap in company pension schemes which will need to be filled in coming years. The good news is that, from lower levels, there is a better chance of achieving higher investment returns in future.